

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC# 8768-82
29 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM : Major General Edward B. Atkeson, USA
National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT : Theater Ground Intelligence Problems in Europe

1. In preparation for the trip to Europe I offer for your reading the attached memorandum, which I drafted last January for General Vessey, then Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. The paper is aimed at identifying weaknesses in the Theater Army intelligence structure and recommending solutions, but it also provides insight into the more fundamental problem stemming from the limitation of US intelligence support to US forces in accordance with NATO doctrine.


2. As I mentioned in a memorandum to you previously, intelligence is a "national responsibility" by agreement within the Alliance. The attached memo illustrates how that agreement has driven the US Army to focus its efforts for the development of its tactical intelligence apparatus on echelons at US Corps level and below. There is simply no doctrinal justification for the commitment of resources to supporting Allied or NATO field headquarters. Considering the disparities between the systems available to US commanders and those of the allies, the need for such support would undoubtedly become clear in wartime, but there is little likelihood that the infrastructure could be developed in time to be effective once hostilities were joined.

3. The term "EAC" (echelons above corps) features prominently in the attached paper. This pertains to such NATO headquarters as Northern and Central Army Groups (NORTHAG and CENTAG), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and (to a lesser extent) SHAPE itself. The TAA (Total Army Analysis) study referred to is an annual theater war simulation conducted by the Army Concepts Analysis Agency which provides the analytical basis for Army program and budget requests to DoD and the Congress.

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4. I particularly call your attention to paragraphs 13, 15 and 16 which define the problem. Paragraphs 17 through 29 outline the type of theater ground intelligence structure which I believe would be required to support a successful defense. Note that in wartime up to 10,000 persons might be needed. There is no possibility that such an organization will ever be assembled--or even planned for--as long as intelligence remains a "national responsibility."



Edward B. Atkeson

Attachment:

Memo from MG Atkeson to GEN Vessey,
CSCA-ZA, dtd. 20 Jan 82

All portions of this memo
are SECRET.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
DDCI

VIA : C/NIC
VC/NIC

FROM : NIO/GPF

SUBJECT : Theater Ground Intelligence Problems in Europe

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